Update - 5 Oct 2006. I was
emailed by a Thai historian, Khun Songklod who's version of events appears
at
http://www.lemaire.happyhost.org/ship/edito/9993.html.
From reading it there are several discrepancies between the Thai & French
versions of the battle as the Editor points out:
Editor's note: The Thai and French points of view
are clearly contradictory about what happened during the first encounter,
south of the island. According to the above article, there were two
torpedo-boats present and both were destroyed. The Sri Ayudhaya was neither
sunk nor even present. The French version speaks of three torpedo boats and
one coastal battleship. The first torpedo attack of the Lamotte-Picquet
would have hit the Sri Ayudhaya, while the Thai claims that it missed.
Without pretending to decide between the two points
of view, the editor allows himself to mention two facts favoring the Thai
thesis: 1. The encounter happened in early hours, middle in a winter day
with a little fog and rain. The Thai ships were confused with the land
background. Since the French did not go nearer than several thousands
meters, an error of observation is more probable on their side than on the
Thai side. 2. The French are contradicting themselves when they claim to
have performed a clean sweep among the Thai ships in the south of the
island, while they recognize that the Sri Ayudhaya had only run aground and
that one of the torpedo boat survived the battle.
By David Manley
Despite the fall of France in 1940 the
Vichy government still held sway over France's colonial territories abroad.
One of these territories was French Indo-China, what we know today as
Vietnam and Kampuchea (Cambodia). With the defeat of mainland France obvious
doubt was thrown over her ability to defend the far flung outposts of the
empire. French Indo-China held a particular attraction to her neighbour to
the West, Thailand. In late 1940 the Thais began a series of cross border
attacks by troops and aircraft against the French possessions, aimed at
annexing those parts of French Indo China which the French were unable to
hold on to. These attacks tended to concentrate in the coastal regions of
Cambodia, to the west of Saigon. The Thais naturally saw themselves as
filling a power vacuum which had been created by deflating French colonial
interests. The French, however, had other ideas and a state of war was
assumed between Vichy France and Thailand (then still often referred to as
Siam). Since the main thrust of the Thai assaults had been along the coast
the French considered a naval operation against the invaders, although there
was grave concern over strengths of the Thai armed forces which would oppose
such a mission.
The Royal Thai Navy could in no way be
regarded as a pushover. A number of new vessels had recently been delivered
from Japan and Italy. The major units of the fleet are listed in Table 1,
and included two Japanese-built armoured coast defence vessels which
displaced 2,500 tons and carried 8" guns, two older British built armoured
gunboats with 6" guns, twelve torpedo boats and four submarines. In addition
the Royal Thai Air Force had in its inventory over 140 aircraft, including
relatively modem Mitsubishi Ki-30 light bombers, which saw extensive service
against the French. These aircraft in themselves were quite capable of
causing severe damage to any French naval mission which may be mounted.
Other less capable aircraft in the Thai inventory included 25 Curtiss Hawk
75N, 70 Vought Corsair biplanes, 9 B-10 bombers and several Avro 504
trainers.
Despite the strengths of the Thai
forces the French Governor General of Indo-China and Commander-in-Chief
Naval Forces, Admiral Jean Decoux, decided that the naval mission should go
ahead. A small squadron, the Groupe Occasionnel, was formed on 9th December
1940 at Cam Ranh Bay, near Saigon, under the command of Captain de Vaisseau
Berenger. The squadron consisted of the light cruiser Lamotte-Picquet, the
colonial sloops Dumont d'Urville and Amiral Charner, and the older sloops
Tahure and Marne. There was no air cover to speak of, apart from eight Loire
130 seaplanes based at Ream which provided reconnaissance. Additional
scouting was provided by three coastal survey craft, and intelligence
gleaned from the local fishermen.
Berenger's squadron began training
manoeuvres in Cam Ranh Bay shortly after coming together. Early in the new
year, on January 13th 1941, Admiral Decoux formally requested Berenger to
send the squadron against the Thais to act in support of a land offensive
planned for the 16th. This operation was intended to throw back Thai forces
which had been advancing along the coast. Because of the disparate speeds of
the French ships Berenger sent the slower sloops on ahead, whilst he
remained in Saigon to complete the final elements of the plan. Several
options were currently being prepared, the Admiralty in Paris having
recently given its formal blessing to the use of naval forces in support of
the army. The final planning meeting of the 13th saw an immediate delay in
the execution of the operation for 24 hours. With the plans finalised,
Berenger sailed in Lamotte-Picquet, the delay in the start of the operation
allowing him to refuel at Cap St. Jacques before the rendezvous with the
slower ships at 16:00 on the 15th, 20 miles North of Poulo Condore.
The orders from Admiral Decoux were
clear and simple, "Seek out and destroy the Siamese naval forces from
Satahib to the Cambodian frontier". On the evening of the 15th, following a
final conference on board the flagship, the squadron weighed anchor at 21 15
and closed the Thai coast at 14 knots, the best speed of the sloops. The
French ships remained undetected as they entered the Gulf of Siam, but their
quarry was not so lucky. The Loire 130s from Ream had completed a sweep of
the coast from Krat to Satahib. They had located one coast defence ship and
three torpedo boats at Koh Chang, and one gunboat, four torpedo boats and
two submarines at Satahib. Their report was sent to Marine Headquarters in
Saigon, who retransmitted the report to the Lamotte-Picquet. Berenger
considered his options in the light of this intelligence and opted for a
dawn attack on Koh Chang. He discounted an attack on Satahib because it was
not possible for the sloops to reach the port until later in the day, by
which time the Thai force was likely to have been alerted to the French
presence and the element of surprise would be lost. In addition there was
doubt as to the contribution which the harbour defences at Satahib could
make. Finally the force at Koh Chang, although formidable, was the weaker of
the two and was thought to offer the best chance for victory.
Berenger's plan of attack was as
follows. The squadron would approach at dawn from the South West. Because
the anchorage at Koh Chang was surrounded by islands and islets, many of
which were over 200 metres high, the squadron would break up and use the
cover of the islands to concentrate fire on portions of the Thai squadron
whilst covering all the avenues of escape. The easternmost channel was
regarded as the most likely route by which a breakout would be made - this
was the most suitable route and was also the area in which the recce report
had placed the largest Thai ships. The Lamotte-Picquet would head to the
eastern side of the anchorage to block this route whilst the colonial sloops
blocked the centre and pounded the Thai ships there. The smaller French
ships would concentrate to the West.
The Attack
The French squadron closed on the
anchorage at 05:30 on the 17th. At 05:45 they split into the three groups as
planned, the Lamotte-Picquet heading for the Eastern part of the anchorage,
Dumont d'Urville and Amiral Charner continuing to the central position and
the Tahure and Marne heading for the Western side. Conditions were perfect -
the weather was fine, the seas calm and almost flat. Sunrise was due at
06:30, and the scene was lit only by the first rays of light on the horizon
and by the dim moonlight. A final aerial reconnaissance of the target area
had been arranged using one of the Ream-based Loire 130s (Lamotte-Picquet
carried two such aircraft, but these could not be launched due to catapult
problems). At 06:05 the Loire 130 overflew the anchorage and reported two
coastal defence ships. This came as a nasty surprise to the French -
previous reports led them to believe that only one of the large defence
ships was present, but during the night the Dhonburi had arrived to relieve
the Sri Ayuthia, which was to return to Satahib later that day. Once their
presence had been passed to the Lamotte-Picquet the aircraft attempted an
attack of its own using bombs, but was forced off by a heavy barrage of AA
fire. The effect of this mission was double edged - the French were now
aware that they faced both the Thai heavy units, but the element of surprise
had been wasted and there was still thirty minutes to go until sunrise.
Caught napping by the oncoming French the Thais desperately began to raise
steam and make preparations for slipping their anchors. The coastal defence
ships had an advantage over their smaller consorts since, being diesel
powered they were able to get under way almost immediately.
Despite their initial shock at coming
under attack it was the Thai forces which opened fire first at 06:14 when
the range had come down to 9,000 metres. The French responded almost
immediately. Lamotte-Picquet fired at the dark shapes in the anchorage and
fired a spread of three torpedoes at 06 20. One torpedo was seen to hit the
coastal defence ship Sri Ayuthia. Heavily damaged by the torpedo and gunfire
she headed for the cover of the islands and was finally beached on the
mainland. The torpedo boat Trad then became the Lamotte-Picquet's next
target. She was heavily damaged and also disappeared behind the cover of the
islands, where she later sank. Fire then switched to the remaining torpedo
boats, Chonburi and Songhkli, which were rapidly overwhelmed and abandoned.
Gunfire from the sloops finished them off at 07:00.
At 06:38 the lookouts on the
Lamotte-Picquet spotted the second coastal defence ship, the Dhonburi, at a
range of 10,000 meters heading to the North West. A running battle ensued
with the fire of both ships frequently blocked by the towering islets. The
fire from the Thai ship was heavy, but inaccurate. By 07:15 fires could be
seen on the Dhonburi, which then found herself engaged not only by the
cruiser but also by the sloops. Believing they had a better chance of
hurting the smaller French ships the Thais shifted their fire onto the
Amiral Charner, which soon found 8" salvoes falling around her. The Dhonburi
shifted fire back to Lamotte-Picquet after a salvo from the French cruiser
put her after turret out of action. Soon she reached the safety of shallow
water which the French ships could not enter for fear of grounding, but it
all came too late for the hapless Thais as the Dhonburi was burning fiercely
and listing heavily to starboard. At 07:50 the Lamotte-Picquet fired a final
salvo of torpedoes at a range of 15,000 metres but lost sight of the
Dhonburi behind an island from which she was not seen to emerge.
For the next hour the French ships
patrolled the area, picking up survivors and ensuring their victory was
total. At 08:40 Berenger ordered the squadron to head for home, but this
coincided with the start of the expected Thai air attacks. Several bombs
were dropped close to the Lamotte-Picquet but a vigorous barrage was put up
by the ship's AA guns and further attacks were not pressed home. The final
raid departed at 09:40, following which the victorious French squadron
returned to Saigon.
The French left behind them a scene of
total devastation. The Sri Ayuthia was heavily damaged and hard aground on a
sand bar in the mouth of the Chantaboun river. She was later raised and
repaired by the Japanese, survived the war, but was sunk by Thai shore
batteries on 3rd July 1951 during an attempted revolution. The Thai
transport Chang arrived at Koh Chang shortly after the French departed and
took the Dhonburi in tow but she eventually capsized that afternoon and was
a total loss. The torpedo boats Trad, Chonburi and Songhkli had all been
sunk. The only survivors were the torpedo boat Rayong, the minelayer Nhong
Sarhai and the fishery protection vessel Thiew Uthok. These three ships,
which had been sheltering to the North of Koh Chang, wisely chose not to
break cover and thus were not observed by the French. At a stroke the cream
of the Royal Thai Navy (stand fast the four submarines) had been wiped out.
The French were elated, for they had inflicted a defeat as decisive in its
way as the Japanese at Tsushima. Their success is all the more notable when
the difficulties of navigating and fighting in such confined waters are
considered, and given the courage and tenacity which the Thai sailors
exhibited during the action (a fact which the French were gracious to
accept). In the end though it was all for nought - five days later the
Japanese government offered to 'arbitrate' in the search for a peaceful
settlement, and soon confirmed the Thai annexations. Even this state of
affairs did not last for long, as Thailand was invaded later that year
during the attacks on Malaya, and was forced to return her short-lived gains
to France at the end of WW2.
Today the island of Koh Chang and its
surrounding waters have been designated a Maritime Nature Reserve. Nothing
remains visible above the surface to remind the visitor of this remarkable
battle.
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